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Abstract: We study whether people’s preferences in an unbalanced market are affected by
whether they are on the excess supply side or the excess demand side of the market.  Our analysis
is based on the comparison of behavior between two types of experimental gift exchange markets,
which vary only with respect to whether first or second movers are on the long side of the market.
The direction of market imbalance could influence subjects’ motivation, as second movers,
workers, might react differently to favorable actions by first movers, firms, in the two cases. Our
data show strong deviations from the standard game-theoretic prediction. However, we only find
secondary treatment effects. First movers are not more generous when they are in excess supply
and second movers do not respond less favorably when they are in excess demand. Competition
has only minor psychological effects in our data.2
1. INTRODUCTION
Gift exchange markets, in the  Akerlof (1982) sense, have been employed as
experimental representations of labor markets with variable effort and of goods markets with
variable quality.  Issues related to cooperative behavior play a prominent role in this form of
market.  The analysis of these markets, first studied experimentally by  Fehr, Kirchsteiger and
Riedl (1993), has shown that behavior usually deviates substantially from simple own-payoff
maximization. Yet some of the motivational underpinnings of the remarkable behavior observed in
these experiments has not been fully explored.
Our aim in this paper is to study whether market conditions affect people’s preferences.
More specifically, we investigate to what extent the state of competition, as defined below, affects
the patterns of gift exchange.  By the state of competition we refer to the relationship between the
number of firms and the number of workers; in the gift exchange markets we study, this relation
determines the degree of excess supply or demand for labor.  We believe that the psychology of
competition is an important economic issue.  If the state of competition had a significant effect on
motivation, this result would affect the very basis of how economists think about markets, since it
would show that a specific feature of the economic environment has an effect on people’s
preferences.
One can describe the basic sequence of events in an experimental gift exchange market in
the following manner: There are two types of agents (firms and workers) participating in the
market, and the number of firms may or may not be equal to the number of workers.  First, firms
make wage offers in a one-sided auction and workers have the opportunity of accepting them; in3
the standard case, workers cannot make counter-offers.
1  After a worker has accepted a firm’s
offer, the two parties become matched and the wage (and so the worker’s base income) cannot
be changed.  A firm can only be matched with one worker and vice versa. Workers then choose
effort levels, where there is no requirement that effort be greater than the lowest possible level.
Higher wages yield lower monetary payoffs for firms and higher ones for workers, while higher
effort levels have the reverse effect on payoffs.  It is customary to conduct experimental sessions
with multiple periods of the gift-exchange market just described. However, no identification of the
other person in a match is possible, so that each interaction is considered to be a separate event.
The standard game-theoretic prediction is that workers will invariably choose minimum
effort, since this choice is dominant in a pecuniary sense; in anticipation of this, firms will only
make the lowest possible wage offer.   Evidence from both our study and others, however, shows
substantial deviations from the equilibrium prediction.
2  What drives the observed behavior?  One
possibility is that behavior is induced purely by concerns about the distribution of outcome
payoffs.  It could, however, also be affected by other circumstances; when evaluating a situation,
people may not only be motivated by the payoffs at the outcome but also by a variety of other
factors surrounding the act of choice.  The focus of our study is very much related to the more
general theme that preferences may depend not only on the outcomes that follow from certain
choices, but also on information concerning the process leading to these outcomes.  Such non-
outcome information may matter because it offers inferences about the intentions or disposition
behind the actions of others.
                                                
1 Falk and Fehr (1999) study the case where workers can make counter-offers.4
Our investigation in this paper is part of our more general interest in a broader theme: the
experimental analysis of the effects of non-outcome information on behavior. Current research in
the area is directed toward delineating more specific features of this behavior.  It is at this point
clear that in many situations people are influenced by others’ payoffs at the outcome.  However, it
remains to be seen to what degree explanations of observed behavior need consider non-outcome
information pertaining to the circumstances surrounding the act of choice.  Note that it would be
difficult to carry out this kind of analysis on the basis of field data alone, since in natural
environments it will be unusual to find data with the desired variations in the non-outcome
information.  By contrast, experiments make it possible to generate this kind of evidence in a
systematic manner.
Our results suggest that gift exchange behavior is not substantially affected by market
imbalance.  We do not find significant differences in wages or effort levels chosen with differing
directions of market imbalance, although we do find some secondary effects across treatments.
Motivation appears to be largely independent of this one specific feature of market participation.
In our final section we present a discussion of the manner in which our results mesh with other
findings concerning the effects of non-outcome information on choice.
2. BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Why should the existence of unequal numbers of firms and payoffs influence subjects’
motivation in this context? The conjecture that motivates our study is the possibility that workers
                                                                                                                                                    
2 Other recent evidence of this includes Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger (1997), Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998) and
also Hannan, Kagel and Moser (1999).5
perceive a higher wage to be the result of different motivations on the firms’ side: inspired by
“generosity” (when there is an excess of workers) or “competitive pressures” (when there is an
excess of firms).  To the extent that perceptions of employer motivations vary depending on the
nature of market imbalance, we might observe differential effort choices.
Information about the state of competition may be useful for inferring others’ intentions
because it pertains to the opportunities that others’ have in the market. In his review of the
connections between psychology and economics, Rabin (1998) discusses the relationship
between opportunities and the attribution of intentions.  He states that: “When motivated by
reciprocal altruism, for instance, people differentiate between those who take a generous action by
choice and those who are forced to do so.”  Whether people are “forced to be generous” may
depend on the situation in which they find themselves.
Bowles (1998) presents a detailed survey of the literature on the different ways in which
institutions may affect values, tastes and personalities.  One of the several issues he discusses is
closely related to the effect of market imbalance on the motivation of market participants.  He
states: “...or to take another example, there are significant differences in the personality effects on
participants in markets which clear in equilibrium and those which do not, and in those markets
which do not clear, for people on the short side of the market (whose advantageous positions may
allow them to make take it or leave it offers) and those on the long side of the market, some of
whom are simply excluded from the exchange process, while others fear losing the transactions
they have secured.”
3
                                                
3 For a more general discussion of the effects of participation in markets on preferences see also Lane (1991).6
The possible influence of non-outcome information on choices has recently been
introduced into a number of theoretical models of motivation.  Sen (1997) provides a general
discussion of the influence that the act of choice may have on behavior and suggests that relevant
factors can be classified as either chooser dependence or menu dependence.
4  Differences in
characteristics of decision-makers reflect  chooser dependence, while the possible impact of
foregone opportunities (or of social information) relates to menu dependence.  Any effect on
behavior from the type of market imbalance may be seen as a form of menu dependence.
Models of interdependent preferences differ with respect to whether motivation is affected
by non-outcome information.  Rabin (1993) presents models of reciprocal altruism, in which
beliefs about intentions can affect behavior in two-person normal-form games.  In contrast, Bolton
and  Ockenfels (2000) and  Fehr and Schmidt (1999) propose models in which individual
motivation is increasing in one’s financial reward and decreasing in disparities among payoffs, but
does not depend on other circumstances.  Charness and Rabin (1999) respond by offering
experimental evidence on the effects of forgone alternatives on choice, as well as a model of
“quasi-maximin” social preferences (a combination of utilitarian and Rawlsian preferences).  In this
model, one’s willingness to sacrifice to allocate the quasi-maximin allocation to someone depends
on the extent to which that person is believed to be acting in consonance with this social ideal.
Previous experimental studies have looked at non-outcome information of different types.
One line of work has investigated whether the decision made at a given choice set is influenced by
the nature of the process that led to this choice set.  For example, several papers vary whether a
                                                
4 Sen’s classification is a useful organizing tool, although it may not easily cover all ways in which non-outcome
information may affect behavior.7
self-interested party or some external mechanism determines the choices available to the
subsequent player. This relates to Sen’s concept of  chooser dependence. Blount (1995) and
Offerman (1998) find evidence that behavior in sequential games is affected by the process
leading to the available alternatives. Charness (1996a) is perhaps the most closely related to our
work here, since it is based on experiments with gift exchange games. He finds that what he refers
to as attribution of volition has a significant effect on behavior when wages are relatively low.
Another type of non-outcome information that may matter is the nature of any foregone
opportunities.   For instance, in sequential games people may evaluate the intentions behind
others’ previous moves by taking into consideration the outcomes of alternative courses of action
that other players could have taken but didn’t.   Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998) present
some results from simple sequential dilemma games and find that forgone opportunities do not
affect behavior significantly.  On the other hand, Brandts and Solà (1998) and Falk, Fehr, and
Fischbacher (1999) study behavior in games akin to the ultimatum mini-game and find definite
evidence that the likelihood of an offer being rejected is affected by the options that were not
exercised.  In these studies, it is the attribution of negative intentions to the proposer that may have
an impact on responders’ behavior.
5
Cason and Mui (1998) investigate the influence of information about the behavior of
others in the same context on an individual’s behavior.  In their data, social information does not
have strong effects on behavior.  Brandts and Charness (1999) analyze whether subjects’
evaluation of a given outcome is influenced by whether that outcome was reached after a truthful8
or an untruthful statement by another subject; the results indicate that subjects react differently to
the two types of statements.
6
3. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES
To disentangle the possible effects of market imbalance from other potential influences we
need an appropriate experimental design.  This section motivates and presents the design and the
procedures that we used in our experiment.
 
  3.1.  A simple dilemma game in a market environment
 
  Gift-exchange games can be envisioned as two-player dilemma games that are played in a
sequential fashion.  A dilemma game is characterized by the following features: all players have a
dominant strategy and certain joint deviations from dominant strategy play lead to both players
receiving a higher payoff than if both play their dominant strategy.   We can describe sequential
play of a dilemma game in terms of gift exchange.  In the beginning, the first player chooses a
certain gift or contribution level.  After seeing this, the second player decides the degree to which
he returns the gift.
7  These games have a unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium where both
players choose the minimum gift level.
  Embedding a game of this type in a market environment with competition, as in previous
experimental work, does not alter the straightforward prediction of game-theoretic analysis.  As
will be explained below, in an unbalanced market context some agents will not be matched, but
                                                                                                                                                    
5 The evidence about contributions in dilemma games presented in  Bolton,  Brandts and  Ockenfels (1998) is clearly
inconsistent with the reward of good intentions. In contrast, the punishment of bad intentions may explain a portion,
albeit a rather small one, of observed behavior.
6 Note that the first mover is a self-interested party in all of the studies referred to in these last two paragraphs.9
this does not affect the pecuniary incentive structure of subjects given that they have been
matched.
  In our experiments, we use the following simple symmetric and linear payoff functions:
  FI = 10 – w + 5e              (1)
  WI = 10 – e + 5w,            (2)
 
where FI and WI refer (respectively) to firm income and worker income, w denotes the wage and
e the effort level.   The range of possible wage and effort levels is restricted to integers between 0
and 10, inclusive.
8  Each unit of income was worth 5 pesetas ($1@ 150 pesetas, at that time).
    The symmetry and the linearity of the payoff structure are the two crucial features of our
design. As stated above our objective is to study in which way subjects’ behavior is affected by
varying exclusively the number of participants on the two sides of the market, as well as the ratio
between them. The symmetry of the payoff functions is necessary to ensure that the impact of our
treatment variable can be studied in isolation.
9  It implies that, apart from issues of market
imbalance, the only difference between the incentives of the two players is caused by the fact that
one of them chooses first and the other chooses second.  It also makes it possible to think of a
situation with n firms and m workers as symmetric to the case of m firms and n workers.
                                                                                                                                                    
7 In the context of a public good game these gifts can be seen as contribution levels.
8 This payoff function is a slight modification of the standard linear public good payoff function, which for the two-player
case can be written as: Ii=(Ei-Ci) + p(Ci+Cj) i different from j, where Ii is individual i’s income, Ei is i’s endowment Ci and
Cj are the contributions and p < 1 is the marginal per capita return.  The only difference from the standard case is that here
the payoff a player obtains from his own contribution to the public good is different than the payoff he gets as a result of
the other’s contribution, i.e. pi is different from pj and pI < 1.
9 An asymmetric representation could be easily introduced in a subsequent experiments.10
  The linearity of our payoff function helps isolate the impact of the market imbalance on
behavior by making the marginal effect of effort independent of the wage.   If we instead had a
payoff structure in which the marginal effect of the effort level diminished with the wage level there
would be a possible confounding factor.  Lower effort/wage ratios at higher wages might then be
the result of either a motivational effect or a diminishing transformation rate.
10
  Another important feature of our design is that the information available to participants was
the same in both treatments.  All  wage offers were public information both for firms and for
workers, while the effort supplied in a particular match was only known to the two parties in the
match.
11
  It is easy to verify that with these features the standard  subgame-perfect equilibrium
prediction does not depend on whether there are more firms or more workers in the market.   In
the second stage workers have no financial incentive to exert any effort. Given this expected
behavior, the subgame-perfect equilibrium notion predicts that firms offer the lowest possible
wage or do not make any offer.  As a consequence, all agents obtain a payoff of 10,
independently of their type and of the existence and type of market imbalance, i.e. the situation
that arises in the case in which there is no gift exchange at all is not favorable to either side of the
market.
                                                
10 Here the wage is not a pure one-to-one transfer, unlike the payoff design in Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993) and its
successors.  For our purposes, however, the crucial feature of the gift exchange game, from a conceptual point of view, is
the sequential structure of the game and the fact that joint deviations can lead to common gains. Since we wished to
maintain these two features and, at the same time, introduce symmetry, it was not possible to keep the one-to-one transfer
aspect of the payoff structure.  One can think of our design as representing the case where gifts are more valuable to the
recipient than to the donor.
11 An antecedent of the work we present here is Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter (1998).  They compare behavior
in gift exchange markets with excess supply to behavior in a bilateral gift exchange condition.  However, they use an
asymmetric non-linear payoff function in both treatments and information about others’ wage offers is different across the
two treatments.  Given these features, their data can not be used for our purposes.11
 
3.2. The conduct of our experimental sessions
  We conducted a total of eight experimental sessions, four with the excess supply of labor
(hereafter, ESL) treatment and four with the excess supply of firms (hereafter, ESF) treatment.
There were twenty participants in each of the sessions. In the ESF sessions 8 subjects had the role
of employees (workers) and 12 had the role of the employers (firms), while in the ESL treatment
there were 12 employees and 8 employers.  The experimental sessions took place in Barcelona
between June and October 1998, at the Universitat Pompeu  Fabra.  Subjects were recruited
using announcements in university buildings.
  At the beginning of each experimental session all the participants were gathered in a room
and the instructions were read to them, while they read along.
12  During this time subjects could
ask public questions about the procedures.  Then subjects were randomly assigned to one of the
roles and employers and employees were seated in different rooms.  Each period consisted of two
stages: Stage 1 of each period consisted in a one-sided oral auction following Fehr, Kirchsteiger
and Riedl (1993). Employers made wage offers and these offers were written on the blackboards
of both rooms.
13  Firms that had not made a wage offer received a payoff of 10; this gave them
the same payoff than if they had made a wage offer of zero and had then been matched with a
worker who chose a zero effort level.
  To accept an offer an employee had to raise his hand and state which of the outstanding
offers he accepted.  In Stage 2, each employee wrote his effort level on his record sheet.  This
                                                
12 The appendix contains a copy of the instructions.  With the exception of the payoff function they follow quite closely
those of Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993).12
information was then communicated exclusively to the corresponding employer.  We excluded the
possibility of workers rejecting wage offers.  Our trading rules specified that, after the wage-offer
stage of a period was over, workers who had not accepted a wage would be randomly assigned
to the firms whose offers were still outstanding.  In an analogous way, our rules stipulated that a
firm that had not made a wage offer would be randomly assigned to outstanding workers at a
wage of 0.  We believe that these rules add to the desired symmetry of our design.  At any rate, in
our sessions it was actually never necessary to assign subjects randomly according to the rules just
described.
  There were ten market periods in each session.
14  At the end of the period all participants
calculated their period-payoff.  Subjects were paid privately at the end of the session; in addition
to experimental earnings, each participant received 500 pesetas as a show-up fee.
  In the experiments we used the labor market presentation of the situation. Although the
frame may affect behavior, it should have no bearing on our results, since the frame was held
constant across our two treatments.
15
 
4.  RESULTS
In a general sense, we are interested in identifying any type of treatment effect.  As
mentioned in the introduction, we do, however, have a specific conjecture about how the type of
market imbalance may affect behavior: workers will tend to be more generous in ESL than in
                                                                                                                                                    
13 We used telephone technology to communicate the offers to the other room.
14 We used a multi-period procedure to follow standard practice.  While there are 10 periods in each session, the
anonymity should eliminate direct reputation-building.  However, a worker knows that she might be anonymously re-
matched with a firm, so that dynamic considerations may be relevant. A priori it is not clear why these potential dynamic
effects should be different across treatments.13
ESF.  A second  conjecture about workers’ behavior, based on previous evidence, is that in both
treatments effort and wage levels will be positively related.
According to the standard view of economic behavior, effort levels will invariably be zero.
This prediction represents the strong null hypothesis.  In experiments, however, one has to allow
for the presence of decision error.  Although decision error should not be systematic, here the
“error” can only go in one direction, as it is possible for effort levels to take on positive values, but
not negative ones.  Decision error can be conceptualized in more than one way.  For example,
one could presume that subjects just make random errors in their decisions.  Alternatively,
Anderson, Goeree and Holt (1998) posit that relatively costly mistakes are less likely.  Given the
linear structure of our payoff function, incorporating this second conception of errors into the
standard prediction leads to the following (weaker) null hypothesis, composed of two elements:
H0:       (i)  Effort levels are independent of wage levels.
(ii) Effort levels are the same under ESF than under ESL.
Costs of deviations are the same under ESF and under ESL; in neither treatment do these
costs depend on the actions of others.
Our two alternative hypotheses can be formulated as follows:
HA1:  Effort levels are increasing in wage levels,
and
HA2:  Effort levels are higher under ESL than under ESF.
With respect to the second alternative hypothesis we will look at effort levels both overall and
separately for different wage levels.
                                                                                                                                                    
15 For evidence of framing effects see Pillutla and Chen (1999).14
Before we present our evaluation of the hypotheses pertaining to workers’ effort choices,
we present a brief analysis of firm behavior.  As mentioned in section 3.1., it is clear that for the
case of purely self-interested preferences there should be no treatment effects on firms’ behavior.
However, for the case in which preferences have a social component it is not clear how wages
would be affected by the treatments. Under ESL firms’ wage offers are the outcome of the
interaction between firms’ and workers’ motivations. Under ESF, however, the effects of
motivational factors are confounded by the presence of firms’ incentives to enter into a match. For
this reason we do not present any specific hypotheses about firm behavior. Our aim is to present a
complete picture of behavior in our experimental markets; as will be seen below, observed firm
behavior will facilitate the interpretation of worker behavior.
4.1. Analysis of firm behavior
  Figure I presents the wage distribution separately for both treatments, aggregated over
sessions and periods.  In general terms, the differences between the two distributions are not
striking.  If we take the wages paid by firms in ESL (the treatment in which they are on the short
side of the market) as the baseline, wages under ESF are not clearly higher.  However, the higher
incidence of zero wages and the somewhat lower incidence of wages equal to 10 in ESL, shown
in figure I, might be a indication of a possibly lower average wages for that treatment. Another
feature of the distributions for both treatments that we wish to highlight at this point is the high
proportion of wages at the highest possible level for both treatments.
A different perspective on firms’ behavior is given by Figure II, which shows the average
wages over time for both treatments. As in Figure I, the differences between treatments appear to15
be quite small throughout the periods.  In this presentation one gets the impression that in the first
part of the session average wages are higher for ESF than for ESL, while for the second part it is
the other way around.  Next we discuss whether the impressions one obtains from Figures I and II
have any statistical validity.
The statistical analysis of data from gift exchange experiments like the ones we conducted
is a delicate matter.  Due to the interaction between subjects across periods we only have, in the
strict sense, one statistically independent observation per session.  In what follows we base our
analysis mainly on statistically independent information. At some points we also report other types
of tests, if we judge them to be informative.
Table 1 presents average wages for all eight sessions, both for complete sessions and for
the first and second part of the sessions.
16  The results of the (one-tailed) permutation tests we
performed show that the differences in average wages between the two treatments are not
significant at anything close to conventional levels for the three ways of organizing the data.
17
While it could be argued that a high degree of variation across the individual sessions might be
swamping any treatment effect, we point out that a significance level of .014 can be attained with
only eight observations, even with the less powerful Wilcoxon rank-sum test.
The information contained in Table 2 is aimed at examining the statistical significance of the
disparity (observed in Figure I) between the frequency of offers at the lowest and highest wage.  It
presents the proportions of wages equal to zero as well as the proportion of wages equal to ten
for all eight sessions, both for complete sessions and for the first and second part of the sessions.
                                                
16 The overall average wage is 7.45 for ESL and 7.35 for ESF.16
Using the permutation test we again fail to find differences between these two specific features of
the wage distribution.
In summary, the first-movers of our experimental markets do not appear to be affected by
whether they are in excess supply or in excess demand.
4.2 Analysis of worker behavior
The evidence presented until now shows that there is a very strong tendency for gift-giving
in both treatments. It remains to be seen to what extent these gifts are returned. Figure III presents
average effort for the different feasible wage levels for both treatments, aggregated over all four
sessions of the respective treatments.
18  Wages and effort levels appear to be positively related;
we will refer to this pattern of behavior as reciprocal actions.
19  To provide some statistical
validity for reciprocal actions we used the Page test on the basis of session level data.  For each
session we computed the mean effort level for four wage ranges: 0 to 5, 6 to 8, 9 and 10.
20  For
both treatments separately, we can reject the null hypothesis of no relation between wage and
effort levels in favor of the alternative of an increasing relation at the 1% level.
21  In accordance
with previous results we can reject portion (b) of the null hypothesis in favor of HA2.
                                                                                                                                                    
17 In contrast to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, the permutation test also takes into account the differences between the data
for the two treatments. For a discussion of the use of the permutation test in experimental economics see Davis and Holt
(1993).
18 A wage level of two was never observed under ESF.
19 Note that this is not necessarily reciprocity in the sense of the rewarding of favorable actions.  Outcome-based models
predict that an employee would make the same effort choice if a random process had chosen the same wage for the
employee.
20 At the session level we do not always have observations for each wage level.  For this reason, we group the data into
wage ranges.
21 For a reference to the Page test see Siegel and Castellan (1988). It tests the hypothesis that k matched groups are the
same versus the alternative hypothesis that the groups are ordered in a specific sequence.17
We also computed the Spearman rank correlation coefficient for both treatments using
each match as a data point.  For ESL the value of the coefficient is .475, and for ESF it is .503.
Each coefficient is based on 320 observations and is significant at p=.001.  We also computed
individual correlation coefficients: 2/3 of these were larger than .45 and significantly different from
zero, at least at the 10% level.  Another 15% were larger than .25, although not statistically
significant.  The relation at the session level is, hence, the reflection of broad-based use of
reciprocal actions at the individual level.  Note, however, that the tests of the rank correlation
coefficients are based on the questionable assumption of the independence of observations.
With respect to treatment effects, at first sight we do not observe generally higher effort
levels for ESF.  However, simple inspection suggests the presence of two possible non-
anticipated effects.  First, the largest differences correspond to the intermediate wages, 5 to 8.
Second, the rate at which effort levels increase with wages appears to be larger for ESF than for
ESL.  We return to these issues below, after analyzing the evidence related to our main
hypotheses.
  The observed pattern points to the existence of some type of interdependent
preferences.
22  However, the information shown in Figure III does not directly reveal to what
extent the deviations from the standard prediction made both sides of the market better off, a kind
of situation we will refer to as cooperative gains.  It is possible that effort levels were not high
enough to compensate firms for offering positive wages. Data that exhibited a pattern of reciprocal
                                                
22 Note that, given the linearity of the payoff structure presented in section 2, the behavior we observe can not be
accommodated by a formulation based on linear altruism and/or warm glow, since these motivations do not generate the
interdependence of actions that we observe.18
actions without cooperative gains would not be easy to interpret, since firms would be earning less
than at the zero wage level.
  Figure IV shows average firm income FI and average worker income WI per wage level
for both treatments.  Given that the income is 10 at wage = 0, it can be seen directly that, for both
treatments, there are increasing cooperative gains over a range of values of the wage.  In addition,
it is true for both treatments that those firms that offer the highest wage obtain the highest firm
income.  If we combine this fact with the very high frequency of the highest wage, it is clear that in
our game subjects are able to obtain considerable cooperative gains.  Workers, who move
second, obtain a considerably larger share in every instance; worker income is actually very similar
across treatments for all wage levels.
23
  As in Figure III there appear to be some differences between the two treatments.
However, from a number of viewpoints these differences don’t appear to be large. The proportion
of wage offers that obtain cooperative gains is 87% for ESL and 92% for ESF.  Focusing on the
highest possible cooperative gain, it turns out that in the ESL (ESF) treatment 49% (60%) of the
wage offers correspond to a wage equal to 10; if we include wages of 9 then the percentages
jump to 60% (67%).  There are several ways of looking at the attained efficiency level.
24  One
can, for instance, look at efficiency gains at a wage of ten: they are 77% for ESL and 80% for
ESF.  Another measure is given by the efficiency gains, averaged over all matches: they are 53%
for ESL and 64% for ESF.
                                                
23 Given the symmetry of our design, equality of wage and effort yields a simple benchmark for evaluating the degree to
which the second movers take a larger share for themselves.  If wage and effort are equal to each other, then for a level of 1
both sides earn 14.  Increasing wage and effort by 1 leads to a gain of 4 for both sides.  For maximum wage and effort both
sides earn 50.19
It is possible that treatment effects show up not so much in average behavior but rather in
the evolution of reciprocal behavior over time.  Figure V shows the behavior over time of the
average effort level over the 10 experimental periods for each of the treatments.  We do observe
“decay” for both treatments.  While this is in contrast to some earlier experimental results involving
gift-exchange games, public goods experiments provides instances both of decay, as in Isaac and
Walker (1998), and of no decay, as in Saijo and Nakamura (1995).  Note, however, that for
both treatments the average firm income in period 10 is still larger than the equilibrium prediction -
13.06 for ESL and 13.73 for ESF. The data presentation in Figure V suggests that, in earlier
periods, both the average wage and the average effort level are higher in ESF than in ESL.
Some of the impressions suggested by Figures III, IV and V can now be verified on the
basis of the information shown in Table 3.  It presents average effort levels per session, both for
complete sessions and for the first five and last five periods of each session. As for the average
wage levels shown in Tables 1 and 2, the permutation test does not find any significant differences
between treatments.  Table 4 contains the data for three additional session indicators, the
Spearman rank correlation coefficient, the Tobit regression slope coefficient and the average level
of firm income. We feel that this last indicator is a very natural one to use, since it directly captures
the consequences of possible treatment effect for firms’ payoffs. The results shown in table 4
show that the treatment differences for the new set of indicators are again not statistically
significant.
25
                                                                                                                                                    
24 Given the baseline earnings of 10 for both firms and workers and the maximum joint income of 100, the efficiency gains
can be computed as total income in excess of 20 divided by 80, the maximum efficiency gain.
25 Here we are using the  Spearman rank correlation and the  Tobit regression coefficients simply as session summary
statistics and, hence, don’t use the assumption that observations within a session are statistically independent from each
other. For a similar use of Tobit coefficients as summary statistics see Sadiraj and Schram (1999). For both indicators we20
Using the more familiar Wilcoxon  test we can get a better feel of the strength our results.
None of our conclusions about statistical significance would change.  More importantly, the
rankings for the ESF and the ESL treatments are so similar that we would need the data from at
least 5 more sessions to line up perfectly for the Wilcoxon test to confer significance at the 5%
level. This is true for any of the session level tests in Tables 1-4.
At this point we have finished the evaluation of our main hypotheses.  We can easily reject
part (i) of the null hypothesis in favor of the alternative, but cannot reject part (ii).  We now turn
to the analysis of the two non-anticipated features of our data mentioned above.  As mentioned
above, Figures III and IV suggest that the differences in behavior are smaller for the more
extreme values of the wage and larger for intermediate values.  It could be that a very high wage
always seems generous to a worker and a very low wage always seems ungenerous, whatever
the supply/demand imbalance.  This would obstruct any treatment effect at the wage extremes.
On the other hand, an intermediate wage level might be more open to interpretation, and we
might then expect treatment effects to be more likely to manifest.
Table 5 shows average effort levels per session, separately for low, middle and high levels
of wages.  We again do not find any significant differences between the two treatments; even
from this more differentiated perspective we can not reject part (iii) of our null hypothesis.  It is,
nevertheless, true that the difference is largest for intermediate levels, in agreement with the notion
suggested in the previous paragraph.
26
                                                                                                                                                    
encountered the difficulty that in session ESL-4 all accepted wages were equal to 10 and so we could not compute the
statistics for this session.
26 However, note from Figure I that intermediate wage offers are only a modest fraction of all wage offers.21
Data from experimental gift exchange markets have been often been analyzed using Tobit
regressions.  This procedure assumes that the data from different matches within a session are
statistically independent and is, therefore, not fully appropriate for the analysis of our data.  We
have, nevertheless, run various two-sided censored Tobits to explore the apparent difference
between treatments in the rate at which effort levels increase with wage levels. This is done
through the use of treatment dummies.
Table 6 presents the results of these regressions.  Due to the existence of some decay in
our data we present results both 10 periods and for only the first 7 periods.  Regressions 1 to 4
are separate for ESL and ESF and can be seen as baselines; their results are consistent with a
positive relation between effort and wage levels, in accordance with the non-parametric test
results presented above.  Regressions 5 and 6 combine both the ESL and ESF data sets, and
include an ESL treatment dummy on both the intercept and the slope coefficient: ESL*constant
and ESL*wage. We see that these coefficients are both statistically significant (subject to the
caveat about independent observations), and more so when all 10 periods are included.
27
These last regressions express formally the impression one gets from the inspection of
Figure III.  In the ESF case, the wage-effort relation can be seen as having a more negative
intercept and a higher positive slope than in the ESL case.  This finding indicates that there may
be some dimensions to the motivation behind gift exchange that cannot be fully explored with our
design. However, it does not alter our conclusion with respect to the two hypotheses that
motivated our study.22
5. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
The main features of our results that we wish to highlight in this final section are the
following.  Our principal finding is that in our data the treatment effects are secondary, in that
whether firms or workers are on the long or short side of the market generally does not have a
major impact on their behavior. Firms do not pay higher wages when there are more firms than
workers and workers do not exert more effort when there are more workers than firms. We have
not been able to find any significant differences in wages and in effort levels, although we have
inspected our data from a variety of viewpoints. All our indicators are far from showing a
significant difference and it is, hence, very doubtful that data from additional sessions would alter
our conclusions.
The fact that wages are constant across the two treatments facilitates the interpretation of
workers’ behavior in our experiments. It allows us to separate the pure effect of the state of
competition from the indirect effect that market conditions could have through their impact on the
wage distribution. For a worker that is matched with a firm that has offered a certain wage level,
the only difference between the two treatments is the state of competition. Our data allow us to
conclude that market conditions, as an isolated factor, do not affect effort levels significantly.
One reaction to our findings about treatment effects might be the feeling that the kind of
emotions that might cause market imbalance to have an effect on behavior are naturally not
present, and cannot be created, in the laboratory.  While this may be a reasonable conjecture, it
                                                                                                                                                    
27 In their analysis of experimental gift exchange markets Fehr, Kirchler, Weichbold and Gächter (1998), Fehr, Kirchsteiger
and Riedl (1993) and Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998) also use a linear relation between effort and wage levels for their23
must be evaluated in the light of some other features of our results as well as of other relevant
experimental evidence. As discussed in our results section, we find very considerable deviations
from the standard prediction. Our results exhibit a clear pattern of reciprocal actions, as in
previous work on gift exchange.  We also find that subjects are able to attain considerable
cooperative gains.  These statements are valid for both our treatments. The absence of treatment
effects is, hence, not due to the fact that the laboratory leads to a strong adherence to the standard
game-theoretic prediction.
A second way in which our evidence can be put into perspective is by relating it to the
cited evidence favoring the notion that non-outcome information influences behavior.  A
provisional assessment of this evidence points to two patterns: First, non-outcome information
tends to be more relevant when it very directly points to others’ personal responsibility, as in the
cases analyzed by Charness (1996) and Brandts and Charness (1999).  In the terminology of Sen
(1997), chooser dependence may tend to be more important than menu dependence.  Second,
perhaps due to a form of self-serving bias, people may react more strongly to perceived negative
intentions than to perceived positive intentions.
28  Charness and Rabin (1999) find so little positive
reciprocity in their games that their model does not include it.
On the basis of our interpretation of this previous evidence, the modest treatment effects
we found in this paper appear to make sense.  The attribution of disposition on the basis of the
type of market-balance can only be based on a rather indirect channel.  Perhaps the effect of
individual responsibility must be quite clear, as suggested by Charness (1996b).  With competitive
                                                                                                                                                    
Tobit regressions. They also find positive values for the wage coefficient and negative values for the constant.
28 See Offerman (1998).24
bidding, the attribution of responsibility is muted, potentially explaining why the direction of market
imbalance does not seem to be a strong force in our data.  According to our results, appropriate
models of interdependent preferences need not take into account the effects of market imbalance
on motivation.25
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Table 1
Session
ESL-1
June 9,
1998
Session
ESL-2
June 18,
1998
Session
ESL-3
July 14,
1998
Session
ESL-4
October
8, 1998
Session
ESF-1
June 10,
1998
Session
ESF-2
June 19,
1998
Session
ESF-3
July 16,
1998
Session
ESF-4
October
6, 1998
Permutation
test
results
Average
wage in first
part of
session
8.275 4.125 8.675 7.025 8.816 6.85 6.266 10 P=.257
Average
wage in
second part
of session
9.376 5.325 8.25 8.15 6.309 5.622 5.566 10 P=.729
Average
wage in
whole
session
8.825 4.925 8.462 7.588 7.567 6.242 6.917 9.658 P=.45729
Table 2
Session
ESL-1
June 9,
1998
Session
ESL-2
June 18,
1998
Session
ESL-3
July 14,
1998
Session
ESL-4
October
8, 1998
Session
ESF-1
June 10,
1998
Session
ESF-2
June 19,
1998
Session
ESF-3
July 16,
1998
Session
ESF-4
October
6, 1998
Permutation
test results
Proportion
of wage= 10
in first part
of session.
.5 .175 .275 .475 .66 .25 .166 1 P=.243
Proportion
of wage= 10
in second
part of
session.
.925 .3 .5 .75 .312 .383 .383 1 P=.657
Proportion
of wage= 10
in whole
session.
.712 .237 .387 .612 .492 .317 .275 1 P=.443
Proportion
of wage= 0
in first part
of session.
0 .275 0 .1 0 .033 .133 0 P=.643
Proportion
of wage= 0
in second
part of
session.
.05 .375 .075 .15 .183 .3 .35 0 P=.343
Proportion
of wage= 0
in whole
session.
.025 .325 .037 .125 .092 .166 .242 0 P=.50030
Table 3
Session
ESL-1
June 9,
1998
Session
ESL-2
June 18,
1998
Session
ESL-3
July 14,
1998
Session
ESL-4
October
8, 1998
Session
ESF-1
June 10,
1998
Session
ESF-2
June 19,
1998
Session
ESF-3
July 16,
1998
Session
ESF-4
October
6, 1998
Permutation
test
Results
Avg. Effort in
first part of
session
6.225 1.3 5.175 3.425 6.15 3.2 2.925 9.25 P=.771
Avg. Effort in
second part of
session
4.9 1.8 3.750 4.2 2.325 1.525 2.3 7.625 P=.486
Avg. Effort in
whole
session
5.5625 1.55 4.463 3.813 4.238 2.3625 2.613 8.4375 P=.61431
Table 4
Session
ESL-1
June 9,
1998
Session
ESL-2
June 18,
1998
Session
ESL-3
July 14,
1998
Session
ESL-4
October
8, 1998
Session
ESF-1
June 10,
1998
Session
ESF-2
June 19,
1998
Session
ESF-3
July 16,
1998
Session
ESF-4
October
6, 1998
Permutation
test
results
Spearman
rank
correlation
coefficient
.282 .530 .316 .566 .501 .274 .406 - P=.400
Tobit slope
coefficient
.821 .499 1.117 1.442 .983 .913 1.088 - P=.543
Average FI 28.974 12.709 25.655 21.003 22.485 13.121 15.188 39.940 P=.55732
Table 5
Session
ESL-1
June 9,
1998
Session
ESL-2
June 18,
1998
Session
ESL-3
July 14,
1998
Session
ESL-4
October
8, 1998
Session
ESF-1
June 10,
1998
Session
ESF-2
June 19,
1998
Session
ESF-3
July 16,
1998
Session
ESF-4
October
6, 1998
Permutation
test
results
Avg. Effort
for Wages 0
to 4
1.143 .222 0 .118 .222 0 0 - P=.286
Avg. Effort
for Wages 5
to 8
5.615 2.591 3.167 1.455 2.636 1.774 1.15 - P=.143
Avg. Effort
for Wages 9
and 10
6.607 2.682 5.172 5.518 5.653 3.190 3.72 8.4375 P=.31433
Table 6
Regression # 1 2 3 4 5 6
Data set ESL
10 per.
ESF
10 per.
ESL
7 per.
ESF
7 per.
Both
10 per.
Both
7 per.
Dependent
variable
Effort Effort Effort Effort Effort Effort
Constant -4.46
(-4.79)
-9.94
(-7.97)
-4.10
(-3.96)
-8.80
(-6.35)
-9.63
(-8.2)
-8.58
(-6.52)
ESL*constant 4.94
(3.22)
4.32
(2.53)
Wage 1.03
(10.34)
1.64
(12.54)
1.04
(9.35
1.61
(10.97)
1.61
(13.1)
1.58
(11.4)
ESL*wage -0.56
(-3.47)
-0.52
(2.86)34
Figure I: Wage Distribution by Treatment
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Figure II: Average Wages over Time
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Figure III: Average Effort per Wage Level for both Treatments
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Figure IV: Average Firm and Worker Income per Wage Level; Both Treatments
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Figure V: Average Effort over Time
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APPENDIX
INSTRUCTIONS FOR AN ESF SESSION
(TRANSLATION FROM SPANISH)
(The first part of the instructions was read aloud while all the participants were in one room. The
second and third part of the instructions was read separately to employers and employees in their
corresponding rooms. In both rooms we went through the three exercices on the blackboard.)
1.  GENERAL INFORMATION
You are about to participate in a study about the labor market. If you read these
instructions carefully you may earn a considerable amount of money. During the experiment your
earnings will be calculated in “PESOS”. At the end of the experiment PESOS will be converted
into pesetas at the rate of:
1 PESO = 5 PESETAS
In addition you will receive 500 pesetas for showing-up for the experiment. At the end of
the experiment your earnings will be paid to you in cash.
In a moment, each of the 20 participants will be randomly assigned to one of two groups: 8
will be “employees” and 12 will be “employers”.
In the experiment there will be several periods. In total there will be 10 periods. Your total
earnings for your participation in the experiment will be the sum of your earnings in each of the 10
periods.
In each period you  will  partcipate in a labor market. Each labor market will  have two
stages:
Stage 1: In the first stage the employers will make decisions:  they  will be able to make
“wage offers” to the employees. Employees will be able to accept these offers. After 5 minutes
the first stage will be over. At that moment all those wage offers that have not been accepted will
be randomly assigned to some of the employees who have not accepted any wage offer. Then
stage 2 will begin.
Stage 1: In the second stage, each of the employees who have accepted a wage offer will
make a decision: he/she will choose a “quantity of labor”.
Before the experiment starts we will give you a decision sheet on which you will register
your decisions in each period. You will also register the decision of the person in the other group
with  whom  you  have entered into a relation in  the period. After that you  will  calculate  your
earnings.
2.  HOW DOES THE MARKET WORK?
At the beginning of each period the labor market will open. In the first stage of the market
the employers will be able to make wage offers to the employees.40
We will write the wage offers on the blackboards of both the employer and the employer
room as they are made. In total employers and employees will have 5 minutes to trade. Each
employer will be able to make more than one offer, but each new offer will have to be larger than
the highest offer that has not yet been accepted.
If  an  employee  accepts a  wage  offer he/she  establishes a “labor  contract”  with  the
employer  who has  made  the  offer.  Any  employee can  establish a  wage  contract  with  any
employer and any employer can “hire” any employee. However, if an employer and an employee
have closed a labor contract these participants will not be able to establish any other contract in
the period.
When an employess accepts a wage offer of an employer, both should immediately register
this wage on their decision sheets.
No  employer  will  know  with  which  employer he/she has  closed a  contract,  and no
employer will know the employee.
After 5 minutes the second stage will  begin. At that moment  each  employee  who has
accepted a wage will  have  to decide  which  quantity he/she  wants  to  work.  Then  we  will
communicate the quantity of work to the employer  with which he/she has entered into a contract
for the period. No other employee and no other employer will be informed about the chosen
quantity of work.
3. HOW TO CALCULATE YOUR EARNINGS FOR THE PERIOD?
A wage and a quantity of work are transformed into earnings for the employer and the
employee who have  closed a contract in the period. For the employer a wages becomes a cost
and a quantity of work becomes a gain. For the employee the wage becomes a gain  and the
quantity of work becomes a cost.
The employer will  choose a wage between 0 and 10 and the employee will  choose a
quantity of work between 0 and 10.
The earnings (in pesos) for a  period of an employee and of an employer who are matched
will be determined in the following way:
Earnings of the employer = 10 – wage + 5 x quantity of work.
The higher the quantity of work the higher will be the earnings of the employer and the
higher the wage the lower will be the earnings of the employer.
Earnings of the employee = 10 – quantity of work + 5 x wage.
The higher the quantity of work the lower will be the earnings of the employee and the
higher the wage the higher will be the earnings of the employee.
An employer that has not made an offer in a period will obtain an earnings of 10 pesos. An
employer that has made an offer but has not entered into a relation with an employee will obtain
earnings of 10 pesos. An employee that has not accepted any offer may be randomly assigned to41
one of the wage offers that have not been accepted. If there is no wage offer to which you can be
assigned , the employee will earn 10 pesos.
Are there any questions?
During the experiment it will not be allowed to talk or communicate with the other
participants. If you have a question, please, raise your hand and one of us will come to your desk
to answer it.
Now please take one of these pieces of paper. If on the paper you see a “1”, please follow
our indications for moving to another room. If on the paper you see a “2”, please stay in this room
and follow our indications.
INSTRUCTIONS AND EXERCISES FOR THE EMPLOYERS.
An employer who wishes to make a wage offer should raise his/her hand. Once one of us
has given an indication that he/she can talk, he/she will say his/her employer number and the wage
offer. Right after that he/she should register the wage on the decision sheet.
Now we are going to do some exercises. Please, use the expressions to calculate earnings
that we gave to you earlier.
1. Let’s suppose that you, being able to choose wages between 0 and 10, have made a
“wage offer” of 8 pesos which has been accepted by an employee and that in the second stage of
the period the employee chooses a “quantity of work” of 5.
What will be your earnings and the earnings of the employee with which you have closed a
contract for the period?
My earnings = ………………………………..pesos.
Earnings of the employee = ……………………pesos.
2. Let’s suppose that you, being able to choose wages between 0 and 10, have made a
wage offer of 3 pesos which has been acepted by an employee and that in the second stage of the
period the employee chooses a quantity of work of 6.
What will be your earnings and the earnings of the employee with which you have closed a
contract for the period?
My earnings = ………………………………..pesos.
Earnings of the employee = ……………………pesos.42
3. Let’s suppose again that you, being able to choose wages between 0 and 10, have
made a wage offer of 3. However, let’s now suppose that in the second stage of the period the
employee chooses a quantity of work of 0.
What will be your earnings and the earnings of the employee with which you have closed a
contract for the period?
My earnings = ………………………………..pesos.
Earnings of the employee = ……………………pesos.
INSTRUCTIONS AND EXERCISES FOR THE EMPLOYEES.
An employee who wishes to accept a wage offer that has been made should raise his/her
hand. Once one of has given an indication that he/she can talk, he/she will say his/her employee
number and state which wage offer he /she accepts. Right after that he/she should register the
accepted wage on the decision sheet.
Now we are going to do some exercises. Please, use the expressions to calculate earnings
that we gave to you earlier.
1. Let’s suppose that an employer, being able to choose wages between 0 and 10, has
made a “wage offer” of 8 pesos which you have accepted and that in the second stage of the
period you choose a “quantity of work” of 5.
What will be your earnings and the earnings of the employer with which you have closed a
contract for the period?
My earnings = ………………………………..pesos.
Earnings of the employer = ……………………pesos.
2. Let’s suppose that an employer, being able to choose wages between 0 and 10, has
made a wage offer of 3 pesos which you have acepted and that in the second stage of the period
you choose a quantity of work of 6.
What will be your earnings and the earnings of the employer with which you have closed a
contract for the period?
My earnings = ………………………………..pesos.
Earnings of the employer = ……………………pesos.43
3. Let’s suppose again that an employer, being able to choose wages between 0 and 10,
has made a wage offer of 3 which you have accepted. However, let’s now suppose that in the
second stage of the period you choose a quantity of work of 0.
What will be your earnings and the earnings of the employee with which you have closed a
contract for the period?
My earnings = ………………………………..pesos.
Earnings of the employer = ……………………pesos.